Another Boeing 737 Max-8 crash

I get what you're saying and to some extent I agree about what Boeing did or really didnt say regarding MCAS.

BUT....if your aircraft has a repeated runaway trim issue...and I dont care if you call it trim, MCAS, stabilator angle adjustment, zippty effing dooh dah....you treat it like a runaway trim issue and pull the breaker. If those other 2 crews had just pulled the breaker and flown with manual trim then no crashy happens. I dont want to speak for Gino but I believe that's what he was referring to...erryone blaming MCAS instead of saying hey..these guys sucked and should have just pulled the trim breaker.

basically day 1 flying lesson 1...
Rule 1 - Fly the F^&*)ING plane first.
Rule 2 - Errythang else

 

With new up and coming generation of pilots that should not be problem any more

 

I agree, sounds simple right? From my basic understanding, in your analogy it would be like ‘flipping a breaker’ for a device on the aircraft you were never told about or even knew what was. Which is why it confused those fateful folks. Sorry if this was already covered in this thread. I’ll have to start from the beginning to learn. I appreciate the perspective.

 

NO worries...but the MCAS wasnt some stand alone system. It used the planes existing trim system to adjust the angle of the plane under some circumstances. Its basically a flight control law similar to dozens...hundreds??... in both BA and Airbus planes. So when the plane started trimming all weird on those 2 crashes..the pilots should have done what you do when your trim runs away...pull the trim servo breaker. well there are probably 3 or more breakers on that plane so they would have to pull the right one as well.

 

Still waiting for that YouTube channel where you get your information

 

Even easier than that, 2 switches on the right/back side of the throttle quadrant. You’re 100% correct in that MCAS manifested itself as a trim runaway, if the proper response was used, it wasn’t much more than an inconvenience.

 

This is some scary shit up in here.

 

My background is 30yrs of trucking. All these new hires that go through some school, pass all the tests, get a license, and fumble their way through a road test are a danger, once things are NOT perfect. That’s why we see so many Swift/Schneider videos and memes, Amazon trailers in ditches, huge crashes, etc. Imagine that same thing happening in an aircraft, where inexperienced pilots are overwhelmed with the stress of alarms going off, trying to fly and manage a 250’X250’ object, knowing 350 lives are behind them, knowing the alternative to doing the right thing is certain death, etc. No check ride or extended training period could prepare someone for all the unpredictable scenarios flight crews experience, every trip. It takes many years of someone being confronted with scenarios, being able to assess those scenarios, and reacting to them with the proper corrective action, without panic. There’s a huge delta between meeting minimum requirements and being proficient, especially when the stakes are elevated.

 

Forgive my COMPLETE lack of knowledge on the sibjrct, but say they didn’t honestly even know about the breaker, is there time for them to radio and be like “the plane is acting funny and we are gonna crash”

is there someone in the other end that could have told them pull the fucking breaker?

 

Not trying to get political and get off topic, but there are plenty of people on there that put up cuts of him sounding like an idiot. I’ve also watched his channel and listened to his podcast directly to try to understand why people like listening to him and I think he’s boring, monotonous, and says a lot of dumb shit. What do you think of his opinion on pilot error causing the door to fly off?

 

I spent my childhood riding with my dad traveling the country in a truck and then became one of those rookie’s you mentioned. I got a cdl in two weeks and had no idea what I was doing for the first couple years so I completely understand and agree with what you’re saying. I’m just hoping commercial airline check rides have a different standard when it comes to weeding out incompetency. It’s certainly a more complicated and serious thing to do than driving a truck.

 

Would the MCAS stop if you turned off the stab trim on the yoke or hit the AP off? Are there Rudder trim disconnect handles on a 737?

If so, then that'd be similar to being at cruise going 80mph, then have to slow to 60mph on the interstate for traffic. Next, you accidentally or intentionally hit resume on your cruise control that is set for 80 mph and the car drops a gear and starts speeding up to get to 80 MPH but you see you are are still in traffic and need to slow down. What do you do? You say, o shit and turn the cruise control off and correct the speed. Problem solved.

If the MCAS couldn't be overridden by stab disconnect, AP off, or some Rudder trim disconnect, then it gets a little more difficult I guess.

 

When shit is happening this fast, you can't afford to be distracted with radio communications. Not to mention that it's not something you can expect the controller at the other end of the radio to know. They might have to get a qualified pilot in there or on the phone. It has happened, but it's usually for what I would call a "steady" emergency situations.

 

Robby bobby

In the aircraft world, shit like this is handled thru checklists and training procedures. For example, for an engine failure on takeoff, there would be specific memorized actions to take "memory items", as well as simulator practice of such event, as the pilot needs to simultaneously apply a shitload of rudder, handle the unwanted banking, and fly at different pitch attitudes and speeds and flap settings until reaching a safe altitude. Then theres a following shit ton of checklist items to secure the dead engine, manage system matters, and then a return to landing.

If something occurs which the crew is not prepared for ahead of time thru memory items, then the response is much slower as the crew would first tend to immediate needs and then follow it up with a non memorized checklist of some sort.

The number of memory item checklists must be limited to some degree, or the crew wouldnt be able to memorize them. Theres also 20 pages of limitations that need to be memorized, stuff like the allowable fuel anti ice agent, or maximum ITT for takeoff and cruise, ceiling, etc, etc.

So therr is a tendency to overwhelm pilots with too much stuff to memorize

 

Alright that explains it a little better.

so basically on these situations it was like immediate freefall dive or what?

you say you don’t have time to radio, but how long does it take to fall out of the sky?

i know im probably being an idiot, and its not intentional but my mind is going like this:

ok we are at 10,000 feet so how long does that take to get a plane down with this issue? Does it put it into a dive where you’re impacting the ground? Obviously im probably watching too many movies just thinking that if i know my altitude and know I have maybe 1-3 minutes, i would try to radio very specific the issue and try to resolve? Instead of digging through a book? I mean? Can you ask a co-pilot if it’s something you forgot in training but maybe he remembered?

or maybe it’s like 10 seconds to impact type thing?

 

Well this explains United's hiring policy. Just who ought to be running an airline.

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2024/01/oh-my-bizarre-footage-emerges-showing-woke-anti/

 

The rules are
#1 aviate
#2 navigate
#3 communicate

 

@Robby-Bobby Stab Trim Runaway checklist hasn't been changed since the first 737 was delivered in the 1960's. If the trim runs away, you trim against it (Trim is a normal flight control that's used every flight, 100x per flight, it's a thumb switch on the yoke.) IF that doesn't stop the runaway, you flip off the two electric trim cutout switches right below the throttle. It takes 2 seconds. IF this checklist had been run, the plane would have flown just fine.

Stab Trim Runaway is a Memory Item, meaning you have to be able to execute it from memory to pass a check ride here in the USA.

We know that the first step was working because in the data stream from the Black Box, you can see the pilots trimming against the runaway, and the manual trim switches were overriding the computer that was causing the runaway, as designed. But the pilots stopped manual trimming and tried to engage the autopilot multiple times, all while the trim was running away (!?!) This led to a grossly out of trim condition. Had they even continued to fly the aircraft manually, Trimming against the runaway and pulling the thrust back OR, run the Stab Trim Runaway checklist instead of trying to engage the autopilot and do other things, the plane would have been fine.

The Eithiopian First Officer eventually used the trim cutout switches, but by they had gotten the aircraft so out of trim that they struggled to move the manual trim wheel due to aerodynamic loads and speeds well above the redline. So they re-engaged it and again tried the autopilot. In other words, they let the emergency develop for far too long before running the checklist and at that point they were almost doomed.

The Lion Air crash, that aircraft had the same exact problem on at least 2 prior flights and they failed to fix it. The crews even continued to the destination instead of diverting! Which shows the mentality that they either didn't understand the severity of the problem, or were willing to accept a much lower standard of safety than any US pilot would.

@BrentA MCAS really wasn't it's own system. The aircraft has Speed Trim, Electric Trim, Autopilot Trim, Mach Trim. These are all names for lines of code in the Flight Control Computer that can move the Stabilizer Trim electrically. MCAS is just another line of code. Yes, Boeing should have told operators about the new way the FCC could manipulate trim, but in their view, it's far less important what line of code in the computer is causing the trim to run- if the wheel is moving, the FCC is trimming. They also screwed up by giving it too much authority to keep on trimming, and by making it rely on only one sensor. But those were contributing factors IMO, not root causes.

The analogy I used is, if you have an engine fire, do you care if it's because of a bird impact, failed hydraulic or fuel line, or an overheat? Not really. You run the engine fire checklist and land. Same goes for Stab Trim Runaway. If the trim is running away, I don't care what line of code or crossed wire is making it happen, I just cut power to the stab trim and land the bitch!

 

This is what I worry about. You can train anyone to respond to certain "common" emergencies that we practice alot- engine failures, pressurization problems, runaway trim, etc. etc. But in real life, emergencies rarely present themselves exactly how we've trained for them. You have to be able to fly the aircraft and think at the same time. Just being good enough to get through a check ride is not good enough IMO. There are lots of pilots (around the world especially) that are out there flying to this standard- and the planes, mechanics, and safety procedures are so damn good these days that 99% of the time they are fine.... Right up until they aren't. I don't like to speak ill of the dead, or be harshly judgmental of crews that were faced with a very shitty situation, but if those 2 737's had been flown by US Airline pilots, those planes would have landed.

 

Yeah its all a big "it depends".

I can't comment on the specifics of the 737 EMAS accidents because my employer was involved to some extent. But I can discuss pilot training and such. In the western world the two pilots are usually equally competent. Its not like the FO is clueless and worthless.

But for things that are trying to swat the airplane out of the sky, there's nobody on the radio that would be able to help. Its all on the crew.